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The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Probation Status Is Beyond The Scope 




 The district court concluded that checking probation status is not “a permissible 
task tied to the traffic infraction.”  (R., p. 101.)  The opinions the district court relied on 
do not support its holding.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)  Other courts that have considered 
this question have universally held the opposite.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)   
 Burgess argues the district court was correct for three reasons.  First, she argues 
that no background check on a passenger (as opposed to a “driver or owner of the vehicle, 
or the apparent traffic violator”) is allowed.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 10.)  Second, she 
argues that ascertaining Craig’s probation status was not “justified as an officer safety 
measure.”  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 11-12.)  Finally, she argues that other courts holding 
that probation status was part of an allowable routine background check did not actually 
hold that probation status was part of an allowable routine background check.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-14.1)  Burgess’ arguments do not withstand analysis.  On the 
contrary, application of relevant legal authority shows the district court erred when it 
concluded that checking Craig’s probation status was beyond the scope of an allowable 
traffic stop of Burgess. 
                                            
1 Burgess did not respond to the state’s argument that the authority relied on by the 
district court does not support its holding.  (See generally Respondent’s brief.) 
2 
B. The Fourth Amendment Is Not Offended By Routine Background Checks Of 
Passengers 
 
 An officer is allowed to ascertain the identity of a passenger in a traffic stop.  
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181–82, 90 P.3d 926, 931–32 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. 
Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 44 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2002).  Once that identification is 
ascertained, a routine background check of the passenger is allowed.  United States v. 
Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (“a request for identification and a 
subsequent check of the occupants’ criminal history constitute steps reasonably necessary 
to protect officers’ personal safety” (internal quotes and brackets omitted)); United States 
v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 
383 (5th Cir. 2010) (check on “vehicle and its occupants” is “within the legitimate scope 
of the stop”); United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (checking “the 
occupants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car” in a traffic stop is a “procedure 
permissible even without reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 
F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (no Fourth Amendment violation in “requesting [the 
passenger’s] identification and checking [his] driver’s license or Oregon ID card with 
radio dispatch”); United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (“an officer 
may ask for identification from passengers and run background checks on them as well”).  
Application of these relevant legal standards shows that ascertaining the passenger, 
Craig’s, identity and running a background check on him during the course of the traffic 
stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 Burgess cites no cases to the contrary.  Rather, her whole argument is premised on 
the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 
3 
S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015), couched its language in terms of checking the driver’s identity.  
(Respondent’s brief, p. 10.2)  In Rodriguez, however, there was a passenger and a records 
check on that passenger, conducted after the records check on Rodriguez but before 
issuing Rodriguez a warning in lieu of a citation.  Id. at 1613.  The Court held that 
Rodriguez was unreasonably detained “after completion of a traffic stop.”  Id. at 1612.  
Nothing in the holding or analysis of the Court suggests the traffic stop was 
unconstitutionally extended prior to issuance of the warning by conducting a records 
check on the passenger.    
Furthermore, the Court also stated: “In [Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
110-11 (1977)], we reasoned that the government’s ‘legitimate and weighty’ interest in 
officer safety outweighs the ‘de minimis’ additional intrusion of requiring a driver, 
already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.”  Id. at 1615.  The Court’s use of the word 
“driver” here was certainly not intended to overturn Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
410 (1997), which extended the Mimms rule to passengers.   
Burgess’ argument that Rodriguez stands for the proposition that permissible 
background checks are limited to the driver is without merit. 
 
                                            
2 The quote in question: “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, 
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 
automobile's registration and proof of insurance.”  Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 




C. Checking Probation Status Is A Legitimate Part Of A Routine Background Check 
 
 As noted in the state’s initial brief, courts that have directly addressed the question 
of whether a check of probation or parole status is within the scope of a Terry or traffic 
stop have held that it is.  (Appellant‘s brief, pp. 5-6.3)  Burgess cites no cases to the 
contrary.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 11-12.)   
 Burgess again relies on Rodriguez, and a case cited therein, United States v. Holt, 
264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001).  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  The entirety of the 
quote (citations and internal quotations omitted) is as follows: 
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the 
government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop 
itself. Traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, so 
an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in 
order to complete his mission safely. On-scene investigation into other 
crimes, however, detours from that mission. So too do safety precautions 
taken in order to facilitate such detours. Thus, even assuming that the 
imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the 
dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis. Highway and officer 
safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to 
detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular. 
 
Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616.  In Holt the court, applying the general principle that 
running a “criminal history check” in the course of a traffic stop is justified, “in part,” by 
“officer safety,” held that an officer may ask about “the presence of loaded weapons.”  
264 F.3d at 1221-26.  Notably absent from these analyses is any discussion of whether 
checking on probation status is a separate criminal investigation or, rather, a “negligibly 
burdensome precaution[] in order to complete his mission safely.”  As set forth by the 
                                            
3 The state will address Burgess’ attempt to distinguish these cases below. 
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state before, a check on probation or parole status is a safety precaution akin to a check on 
warrants or criminal history.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)   
 Burgess also argues that the officers’ subjective reasons for running the 
background check negates a finding that checking probation status as part of a 
background check promotes officer safety.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  Even assuming one 
or more of the officers hoped that the probation check would result in the ability to search 
Craig or the car, such a hope is not exclusive of a background check promoting officer 
safety.  Certainly an officer’s hope that a background check reveals an arrest warrant that 
might also result in such a search would not render such a check for warrants improper.  
To the contrary, the “actual motivations of the individual officers involved” are irrelevant 
to the determination of the reasonableness of the traffic stop.  State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 
463, 467, 988 P.2d 689, 693 (1999) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 Burgess’ argument that including probation or parole status in a standard 
background check is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment standards is not supported by 
precedent. Her claim that the officers’ subjective intent is relevant to this analysis is 
contrary to applicable authority.  Application of relevant standards shows that, like checks 
on criminal backgrounds and for outstanding warrants, a check on probation or parole 
status is within the scope of the routine checks allowed in traffic stops such as this one. 
 
D. Persuasive Authority Supports The Conclusion That Probation And Parole Status 
Are Within The Scope Of Reasonable Background Checks Pursuant To A Traffic 
Stop 
 
 Courts that have directly considered whether questions about probation or parole 
are within the scope of a routine records check that is permissible during a traffic or Terry 
6 
stop have concluded they are.  United States v. Hendrix, 143 F.Supp.3d 724 (M.D. Tenn. 
2015); United States v. Rodriguez, 100 F.Supp.3d 905, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2015); United 
States v. Singleton, 608 F.Supp.2d 397, 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); Miller v. State, 922 A.2d 
1158, 1163 (Del. 2007).  (Cited Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  Burgess’ attempts to 
distinguish these cases are unpersuasive. 
 Burgess first argues that the court in Hendrix “explicitly found that the officer’s 
actions before receiving a valid consent to search did not ‘add time’ to the stop.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (emphasis original).)  The court’s factual findings, however, 
were that the officer learned in the course of his background check that the driver (not 
Hendrix) had recently been charged with drug crimes, which led the officer to suspect the 
driver was on probation.  Id. at 728.  He got the driver out of the vehicle and told him he 
would be issuing him a “warning ticket.”  Id.  After that the officer questioned the driver 
whether he was on probation (he was), asked for consent to search his person, questioned 
the driver about his plans, and only thereafter asked for consent to search the car.  Id. at 
729.  The only way that questioning the driver about his probation status did not “add 
time” to the stop is in the legal sense. 
 Burgess next tries to distinguish Rodriguez, 100 F.Supp.3d 905, by pointing out 
the opinion was issued six days before Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. 1609.  (Respondent’s brief, 
p. 13.)  This argument is irrelevant.  If the Supreme Court of the United States had held 
that probation and parole status is not within the scope of a routine records check 
allowable during a traffic stop, the timing of the issuance of the opinion vis-à-vis lower 
court decisions would not matter.  However, as set forth above, the Supreme Court of the 
United States did not hold, state, or even suggest that inquiries about probation or parole 
7 
status are outside the scope of a reasonable traffic stop.  Burgess has provided no basis for 
distinguishing Rodriguez’ holding that questioning related to probation or parole status is 
“related to officer safety and sought information that would be revealed by a routine 
records check,” which “militate[s] against a finding of unreasonableness.”  100 F.Supp.3d 
at 924.  Nor does Burgess mention the seven cases the Rodriguez court cited as 
supporting the position.  Id. 
 Finally, Burgess attempts to distinguish Singleton and Miller on the basis that 
“[i]n neither case was there a finding that the questioning measurably prolonged the 
detention.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 14.)  However, such a finding is not a prerequisite to 
a holding that inquiry into probation or parole status is allowed during the course of a 
Terry stop.  In Miller the court held that it was “permissible” for the officer “to ask Miller 
if he was on probation, while Miller was lawfully detained initially to enforce the 
loitering statute.”  922 A.2d at 1163.  In Singleton the court held that the officer was 
“justified in asking defendant some basic questions about whether [he] was carrying any 
weapons, or whether he was then on probation or parole.”  608 F.Supp.2d at 404.  Both of 
these holdings, that such questioning is “permissible” and “justified,” are that the inquiry 
into probation or parole status is a legitimate part of an investigative detention. 
 Although none of these opinions are controlling, and this Court’s responsibility is 
not to merely count the number of courts ruling one way versus another, it is significant 
that several decisions support the state’s argument while Burgess has been unable to cite 
any supporting the district court’s conclusion, not even the opinions cited by the district 
court itself.  The reasoning of these courts, in the overall context that routine background 
checks are permissible in traffic stops, shows the district court erred in concluding that 
8 
inquiries into probation status are beyond the scope of permissible inquiries in the context 
of a traffic stop.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order suppressing 
evidence and remand for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 2nd day of March, 2018. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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